V. whereas China’s presence in Latin America, Africa and other continents, being the main trading partner of most countries in these regions, is creating economic dependencies that are influencing foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding the One-China policy, and are yielding negative impacts on good governance, human rights and the environment; W. whereas China is increasingly labelling itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and is seeking influence in the Arctic; whereas the High North and the Arctic are key to European and transatlantic security; whereas China has set up a Polar Silk Road as an extension of its Belt and Road Initiative and is increasing its presence in the Arctic; whereas China is deepening its cooperation with Russia in the Arctic region; X. whereas the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific region requires increased diplomatic efforts from all actors involved, including China; whereas peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas, is of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity, given that these are the world’s most economically vital and strategically sensitive sea lanes; whereas China’s increasing destabilising actions in the region undermine regional stability and threaten the freedom of navigation; whereas some EU Member States have overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, adding to their interest in the region’s security; Y. whereas the EU pursues its One China policy, recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and opposes any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force, coercion or against the will of Taiwanese people; whereas the EU and Taiwan share common values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and have developed solid economic relations and close cooperation in a wide range of areas; whereas EU cooperation with Taiwan is crucial for global prosperity due to Taiwan’s vital role in the semiconductor industry and global supply chains, its position as a significant trading partner for the EU, and its status as a hub for innovation in high-tech sectors; Z. whereas a Chinese Government spokesperson said in October 2025 that China will ‘absolutely not’ rule out using force over Taiwan; whereas China has intensified its campaign against Taiwan across legal, military, informational and political spheres; whereas China’s grey-zone activities and hybrid warfare, including military intimidations, undersea-cable sabotage, military drills, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat, aim to undermine Taiwan’s democracy; whereas the EU must work with its partners in strengthening deterrence capacities against any such attempts by China; AA. whereas Beijing has undermined peace and security in its wider neighbourhood, including through aggressive maritime actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea, by supporting Myanmar’s brutal junta with money and weapons, and through unfriendly or provocative activity towards Japan; AB. whereas China’s military modernisation includes the development of ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, armed drones, and dual-use technologies many of which are subject to EU export controls; whereas China’s official defence budget over the last 15 years has significantly increased in absolute terms; AC. whereas cybersecurity threats, espionage, foreign interference and disinformation