European Parliament
2024-2029

TEXTS ADOPTED

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Recommendation on EU-China political relations

European Parliament recommendation of 7 October 2026 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China political relations (2025/2117(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments, in particular the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the human rights situation in China,

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2024 on Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law[1],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries[3],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People's Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan[4],

– having regard to its recommendation of 26 November 2025 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU's diplomatic strategy and

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1 OJ C, C/2025/1805, 4.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1805/oj.
2 OJ C, C/2026/1664, 22.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1664/oj.
3 OJ L, 2023/2675, 7.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2675/oj.
4 OJ C, C/2025/487, 29.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/487/oj.

geopolitical cooperation in the Arctic[5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020[6], also known as the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA),

– having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2025 on tackling China's critical raw materials export restrictions[7],

– having regard to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987,

– having regard to China's Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) and Global Governance Initiative (GGI),

– having regard to the report '2025 Freedom in the World' published by Freedom House,

– having regard to the 2025 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the bilateral agreement signed between the EU and the People's Republic of China on 16 July 2018, known as the EU-China Ocean Partnership, on cooperation in global ocean governance,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 October 2023 on the implications of Chinese fishing operations on EU fisheries and the way forward[8],

– having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0237/2026),

A. whereas the system of international relations is rapidly changing; whereas the EU's geopolitical interest is to promote a multilateral world that enables it to be a global player; whereas in that spirit the EU should develop its autonomous and consistent policy towards China;

B. whereas the combined population of the EU and the People's Republic of China (China) represents 22,7 % of the global population; whereas the EU and China together account for nearly 30 % of global trade and over a third of global GDP; whereas the EU accounts for 14,5 % of China's total exports, while China accounts for only 8 % of the EU's exports; whereas these figures highlight not only the dimension of the bilateral economic relationship, but also the relevance of the trade imbalance;

C. whereas 2025 marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations

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5 OJ C, C/2026/1722, 24.4.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1722/oj
6 OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj
7 OJ C, C/2026/1447, 31.3.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/1447/oj.
8 OJ C, C/2024/2652, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2652/oj.

between the EU and China and offers an opportunity to assess where the EU's China policy has succeeded and where it has failed and to update the EU's strategic approach; whereas the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 1985[9] remains the main legal framework for their economic and trade relations; whereas the latest EU-China Summit was held in Beijing on 24 July 2025;

D. whereas dialogue and diplomatic engagement remain essential tools for managing EU-China relations despite significant divergences; whereas high-level political dialogue, including the EU-China summit held in Beijing in July 2025, should be maintained to address shared global challenges; whereas such critical engagement must not compromise EU positions on fundamental values and principles, including respect for international law, human rights, and China's full compliance with the rules and principles of the multilateral system and international organisations;

E. whereas relations between the European Parliament and National People's Congress were interrupted from 2019 to 2025 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and China's sanctions against the European Parliament and other EU citizens and entities; whereas in 2025 China lifted sanctions against the European Parliament and the European Parliament decided to resume its relations with China;

F. whereas the People's Republic of China's domestic and international policy has reduced space for partnership and increased competition with the EU and other democracies; whereas China is, of its own accord, clearly shifting EU-China relations towards systemic rivalry; whereas, cooperating where possible, competing fairly and confronting where required is essential to protect EU interests; whereas it is becoming essential for the EU to build leverage while engaging with China;

G. whereas the EU expects China to prove its interest in improving EU-China relations, including a fair trade approach, as well as in preventing decoupling and bloc-based confrontation; whereas the EU's objective should be to strengthen its strategic autonomy, underpinned neither by dependence nor by confrontation, but by principled engagement from a position of strength, protecting European values, interests, security and prosperity while preserving channels of dialogue and cooperation; whereas engagement does not imply endorsement, convergence, lowering of standards or leniency toward violations of human rights; whereas cooperation should be reversible and combine deeper partnership with greater alignment on rules;

H. whereas cooperation with China is necessary to address global challenges, such as climate change, peace and sustainable development; whereas it therefore requires the EU to pursue a principled, coherent, and human rights-centred China policy grounded in international law, democratic resilience and economic de-risking; whereas such a policy should not compromise the EU's own positions on fundamental values and principles;

I. whereas China is a decisive enabler of Russia's illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, serving as the largest provider of dual-use goods and helping it circumvent sanctions; whereas without China's and other countries' support, Russia would not be able to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine to the same

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9 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China (OJ L 250, 19.9.1985, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1985/2616/oj).

extent or with the same force; whereas China’s diplomatic, economic, and material support to Russia’s war of aggression, including the supply of dual use items used in military supply chains, violates the UN Charter and China's own narrative of neutrality, including China’s own Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; whereas China is directly involved in developing ammunition production capabilities in Belarus, including through the provision of key production equipment and production lines, further strengthening the military-industrial capacity available to support Russia’s war effort; whereas the People’s Republic of China continues to deepen its military cooperation with Russia and Belarus, including through joint military exercises, conducted even in the immediate vicinity of the EU, despite both countries engaging in hostile activities against Member States and posing a direct threat to European security;

J. whereas China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and therefore holds responsibilities to uphold a multilateral rules-based international order, and an effective global and digital governance, based on the respect of the UN Charter and international law; whereas China’s position vis-a-vis Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward;

K. whereas China agreed to a ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia on 4 February 2022, and whereas cooperation between the two countries has strengthened in recent years; whereas Chinese and Russian media are disseminating unacceptable narratives about Ukraine; whereas China is cooperating with Russia in areas such as defence, space and trade, as well as in dual-use technologies and in building synergies in the Arctic; whereas China’s President Xi Jinping declined to visit Brussels and instead travelled to Moscow, prioritising China’s relationship with Russia;

L. whereas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only state that has directly deployed troops in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas serious concerns persist regarding potential transfers of nuclear or ballistic missile–related technologies to the DPRK in exchange for arms and military personnel supplied to Russia; whereas, since 2024, Chinese authorities have reportedly forcibly repatriated at least 406 refugees to the DPRK, thus contributing to the serious human rights violations committed under the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Un;

M. whereas the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at EUR 305,8 billion in 2024; whereas the growing asymmetry in EU-China relations in key sectors, including access to markets, technological capabilities, industrial policy and critical raw materials, poses challenges and creates dependencies for the EU, while providing opportunities for Chinese coercion;

N. whereas Chinese industrial policies create massive overcapacities, thereby applying pressure on the European economy and increasingly threatening to hollow out the EU’s industrial core, which may amount to an existential threat to the EU; whereas China is distorting global markets through state subsidies, price dumping and the politicisation of trade; whereas China is blocking European market access and denies legal certainty to European businesses; whereas these hostile and unfair practices are tilting the balance of risks and opportunities in the EU-China economic and trade relationship towards China; whereas China seeks to increase dependencies in EU-China relations; whereas this practice has turned China from a potential partner into a trade and economic competitor;

O. whereas, in particular, China has dramatically expanded its industrial capacity in strategic green and transport sectors, becoming the world's leading producer of solar panels, a dominant global actor in wind turbine manufacturing, and a major exporter of high-speed rail technology; whereas overdependence on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and the green transition renders the EU and its partner countries vulnerable;

P. whereas the EU needs to diversify its supply chains, boost domestic processing capacity and significantly increase its recycling and reuse of critical raw materials; whereas Chinese critical raw materials account for 98 % of all rare earth elements imported by the EU; whereas China holds a virtual monopoly on the production of rare earths, accounting for approximately 60 % of global extraction and 90 % of refining, and on the production of permanent magnets, accounting for 94 % of global capacity, and benefits from a fully vertically integrated supply chain in these sectors; whereas restrictive measures such as export controls on critical raw materials are a direct threat to the European economy, especially the automotive, machinery and defence sectors; whereas China has the largest industrial fishing fleet in the world and, out of the 152 countries examined in 2023 by the IUU Fishing Risk Index, China was the lowest-overall-scoring coastal state for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices;

Q. whereas the EU should pursue an autonomous, interest-based approach that safeguards European economic security and strategic sovereignty; whereas the EU has a considerable trade toolbox it could proactively and assertively use to address the unbalanced EU-China trade relationship; whereas the EU should also work more closely with like-minded partners, such as Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and the United States;

R. whereas China's assertive geopolitical, technological, and economic policies, including its Belt and Road Initiative, can sometimes run counter to the rules-based international order and international governance models, as well as the EU's core values, global partnerships and geopolitical interests;

S. whereas the EU is the world's largest aid donor and China the world's largest international development lender; whereas China's overseas lending has funded major infrastructure projects in developing countries without, however, reducing their debt burdens, and in some cases even aggravating them;

T. whereas, in particular, through a combination of state-directed investment, strategic infrastructure acquisition, technology transfer, influence operations and long-term debt exposure, China seeks to expand its footprint within the EU and the EU's neighbourhood and exploit governance vulnerabilities, economic pressures and institutional weaknesses; whereas this affects transparency, democratic standards and the EU's capacity to promote stability, convergence and rule-of-law reforms in its neighbourhood;

U. whereas, specifically, China views the Western Balkans as a strategic area for its Belt and Road Initiative, investing in their extractive and raw materials sectors; whereas China's investments in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus establish a physical continuum between Asia and Europe, and present both risks and opportunities for the EU's engagement with regional partners;

V. whereas China's presence in Latin America, Africa and other continents, being the main trading partner of most countries in these regions, is creating economic dependencies that are influencing foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding the One-China policy, and are yielding negative impacts on good governance, human rights and the environment;

W. whereas China is increasingly labelling itself as a 'near-Arctic state' and is seeking influence in the Arctic; whereas the High North and the Arctic are key to European and transatlantic security; whereas China has set up a Polar Silk Road as an extension of its Belt and Road Initiative and is increasing its presence in the Arctic; whereas China is deepening its cooperation with Russia in the Arctic region;

X. whereas the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific region requires increased diplomatic efforts from all actors involved, including China; whereas peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South and East China Seas, is of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity, given that these are the world's most economically vital and strategically sensitive sea lanes; whereas China's increasing destabilising actions in the region undermine regional stability and threaten the freedom of navigation; whereas some EU Member States have overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, adding to their interest in the region's security;

Y. whereas the EU pursues its One China policy, recognises the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and opposes any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force, coercion or against the will of Taiwanese people; whereas the EU and Taiwan share common values, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and have developed solid economic relations and close cooperation in a wide range of areas; whereas EU cooperation with Taiwan is crucial for global prosperity due to Taiwan's vital role in the semiconductor industry and global supply chains, its position as a significant trading partner for the EU, and its status as a hub for innovation in high-tech sectors;

Z. whereas a Chinese Government spokesperson said in October 2025 that China will 'absolutely not' rule out using force over Taiwan; whereas China has intensified its campaign against Taiwan across legal, military, informational and political spheres; whereas China's grey-zone activities and hybrid warfare, including military intimidations, undersea-cable sabotage, military drills, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threat, aim to undermine Taiwan's democracy; whereas the EU must work with its partners in strengthening deterrence capacities against any such attempts by China;

AA. whereas Beijing has undermined peace and security in its wider neighbourhood, including through aggressive maritime actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea, by supporting Myanmar's brutal junta with money and weapons, and through unfriendly or provocative activity towards Japan;

AB. whereas China's military modernisation includes the development of ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, armed drones, and dual-use technologies many of which are subject to EU export controls; whereas China's official defence budget over the last 15 years has significantly increased in absolute terms;

AC. whereas cybersecurity threats, espionage, foreign interference and disinformation

operations, academic, research and patent misuse, political infiltration and hybrid warfare tactics attributed to actors affiliated to the Chinese state increasingly undermine European security, democratic resilience, social cohesion and, critical infrastructure; whereas Jian Guo, a parliamentary assistant to Maximilian Krah, an MEP from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party from 2019 to 2024, was convicted in September 2025 for acting as an agent for a Chinese intelligence service;

AD. whereas China is the most frequent perpetrator of transnational repression, according to Freedom House; whereas Chinese diplomatic and consular networks within the EU have also been implicated in acts of transnational repression, including surveillance and intimidation of Chinese diaspora, as highlighted by the discovery of Chinese 'overseas police stations', thereby threatening fundamental rights in the EU;

AE. whereas, despite its claims of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, China has repeatedly violated other states' sovereignty; whereas in recent years, numerous Confucius Institutes in Europe, America and Australia have been closed over concerns that Beijing is using them to spread propaganda, conduct espionage, divert key technologies, and curtail freedom of expression and academic freedom, including through their ambiguous legal status and financial leverage;

AF. whereas China's innovation capacity is rising, and now includes 24 officially designated innovation clusters, three of which rank among the global top 10; whereas, through military-civil fusion, the CCP seeks to eliminate the barriers between China's civilian research and commercial sectors and its military and defence industrial sectors; whereas its goal is to enable China to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world; whereas the CCP is also trying to attract world's cutting-edge technologies including through opaque practices in order to achieve its military goals; whereas China's rapidly expanding research investment poses growing challenges to the EU's technological competitiveness and security interests;

AG. whereas the ruling CCP is a totalitarian party-state which does not share the EU's democratic values, is authoritarian domestically and is allied with several autocracies abroad that contradict and undermine universal human rights and fundamental freedoms;

AH. whereas the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be at the centre of EU foreign policy; whereas the EU and China have, since 1995, formally agreed to maintain a regular Human Rights Dialogue; whereas despite the continuation of this dialogue systemic human rights violations continue unabated in China, alongside severe deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and Macau; whereas China is conducting crimes against humanity, involving mass detentions, the suppression of freedom of religion, and the destruction of culture against an estimated three million Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang, as well as severe repression and forced assimilation in Tibet;

AI. whereas China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1998 but has yet to ratify it; whereas China is nevertheless obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty, pending its entry into force through ratification, in accordance with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;

AJ. whereas freedom of religion and belief continues to deteriorate across mainland China, with the CCP carrying out an intense campaign of ‘Sinicisation’ of religion, requiring all religions to adhere to the party’s ideology, doctrine, and teachings; whereas the Chinese authorities’ interference in the selection of the next Dalai Lama is a politically calculated move to undermine the legitimacy of Tibetan spiritual authority and as such the Tibetan culture and identity;

AK. whereas since China imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on 30 June 2020, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the judiciary’s independence in Hong Kong have collapsed; whereas China has fully breached the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, the Sino-British Joint Declarations and the ICCPR; whereas Hong Kong’s national security police announced that they have issued arrest warrants for 19 overseas-based activists in July 2025, accusing them of forming or taking part in an organisation that authorities claim sought to undermine state power under the NSL imposed by Beijing in 2020 after the 2019 pro-democracy protests; whereas the authorities routinely detain, prosecute and imprison individuals on politically motivated charges, including human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and pro-democracy activists; whereas the case of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, arbitrarily detained since 2015 and sentenced in a closed trial, illustrates the continued disregard for due process and consular access;

AL. whereas, China has fallen to third-last place (i.e. 178th) in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders;

AM. whereas while the amount of workers' strikes in China has increased significantly since 2020, China does not allow the formation of independent trade unions outside of the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) structure and workers’ rights defenders face harassment, surveillance and criminal prosecution; whereas a ban on independent trade unions may entail a discrimination of the fundamental ILO Conventions No.87 and No.98 on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining;

AN. whereas China has increasingly become more vocal and assertive, is turning into a regional hegemon and is rapidly becoming a global superpower; the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China has a significant impact on global security and economic stability, with considerable negative spillover effects on the EU;

AO. whereas through the establishment and use of alternative cooperation formats such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS Plus, as well as by setting up a parallel international order via its four global initiatives, including the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative, China’s attitude towards the rules-based multilateral order is becoming increasingly detrimental;

AP. whereas the EU’s most recent China strategy dates from 2019; whereas a unified, pragmatic, consistent, comprehensive and principled EU policy towards China is therefore needed to determine the EU’s future in global affairs; whereas the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership should be based on the current geopolitical situation and therefore have a clear focus on the EU’s values, strategic autonomy, interests and priorities, including security;

1. Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the

Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

(a) underline that the EU has a vested interest in reinforcing a multilateral world and avoiding bipolarisation, and avoiding military confrontation and conflicts; express the view that dialogue between the EU and China is essential to address a wide range of bilateral and global challenges, including climate change, the strengthening of multilateralism, peace and security, and the promotion of human rights, international development, digitalisation and global public health;

(b) call on China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities, uphold a rules-based international order and support multilateralism and the centrality of the UN in global affairs; engage with China on a reform of the multilateral system, in line with the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, based on the rule of law and international universal values; underscore that China's voluntary contributions to the UN system are not proportionate to its economic position in the world;

(c) underline the 50 years of diplomatic relations between the EU and China; note that the relations have now reached a critical point, mostly due to China's unfair economic practices such as dumping and spying and its position on Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; encourage a more responsible and genuine engagement to enhance mutual understanding and foster genuinely balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation, in full respect of international law and of the universal values enshrined in the UN Charter;

(d) stress that this approach must be flexible enough to adapt to the complexity of the relationship, allowing the EU to react and readjust its stance based on China's misbehaviour domestically and in the international arena, particularly regarding adherence to the fundamental principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force and respect for international law;

(e) condemn and react to China's role as a decisive enabler and dual-use provider of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and increase the cost for this stance; underscore the Chinese diplomatic backing and material assistance that sustains the Russian military-industrial complex; in particular, express deep concern over credible evidence of China's growing involvement in the supply chain for Russian weapons, and drones, including the provision of dual-use technologies, components, and high-tech equipment that directly bolster Russia's capacity to strike Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure; further express deep concern over verified reports that the Chinese military has trained Russian military personnel to fight in Ukraine;

(f) urge China to immediately cease all forms of assistance to Russia and to stop contributing to the prolongation of the war; coordinate a transatlantic and G7 diplomatic initiative to present China with clear, time-bound demands, as well as meaningful repercussions in order to encourage it to use its considerable influence on Russia to end its war of aggression, withdraw its troops from occupied territories, pay reparations, unconditionally release all prisoners of war as well as captured civilians and children, and surrender war criminals and those responsible for the crime of aggression to an international court for trial, and to prevent the

circumvention of international sanctions;

(g) act immediately with partners and allies to extend targeted restrictive measures and the listing of entities and supply-chain nodes that materially assist Russia, complemented by enforcement measures against shadow shipping and re-export schemes; in parallel, adopt binding risk-based measures to prevent sensitive technology transfers to China, including safeguards in research cooperation mechanisms to prevent use for military and surveillance purposes, or human rights violations, as well as to avoid technology transfer to countries sanctioned by the EU such as Russia, Iran or North Korea;

(h) urgently take action in order to address the weaponisation of critical dependencies by China and rigorously pursue the strategy of economic de-risking and economic rebalancing in EU-China relations; acknowledge that de-risking should focus on specific strategic sectors such as critical raw materials, critical medicines, industrial magnets and , biotechnology, quantum computing, battery and battery components, electric vehicles, ICT and semiconductors; establish robust mechanisms to safeguard critical technologies, infrastructure and supply chains, promoting European strategic autonomy while maintaining pragmatic engagement with China that facilitates non-confrontational coexistence, protects European values and interests, and supports and complements a coherent and assertive China policy; investigate Chinese coercive behaviour in the area of rare earths and consider the use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument;

(i) ensure that the EU's de-risking strategy is accompanied by climate, energy and industrial policies that avoid increasing dependencies on Chinese components and technologies as well as targeted investment in European industrial capacity and innovation, particularly in critical technologies and advanced materials, to reduce external dependencies, move production to the EU and foster competitiveness within the single market; in particular, de-risking must prioritise strategic autonomy, sustainability, and circular-economy solutions that fully comply with human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental standards;

(j) recognise that the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) market poses a big threat to the EU EV market due to the fact that China exports its manufacturing surplus, thus making the EU EV market less competitive and specifically harming countries whose GDP relies heavily on the automotive sector; recognise that Chinese EVs and the technology they use pose a security threat, and that the EU should adopt effective legislation to prevent such technologies being used to collect sensitive data from EVs;

(k) ensure the strict application of customs duties on small non-European parcels valued at EUR 150 or less, in force since the 1 July 2026, and of the EU-wide handling fee on small parcels applicable from 1 November 2026; check the effectiveness of existing measures in curbing the harmful effects of practices such as 'ultra-fast fashion'; stand ready, where necessary, to urge Member State authorities to adopt any further action required to intensify and tighten controls on non-compliant, dangerous or unsafe goods often sold through Chinese online platforms (such as Temu, Shein or AliExpress);

(l) take action to prevent further security risks arising from Chinese foreign

investment by strengthening foreign direct investment (FDI) screening in Member States, particularly in strategic sectors such as media services, critical raw materials, critical infrastructure and technologies; urgently address the monopolistic positions of China in critical and essential chokepoints by prioritising the strengthening of alternative resilient supply chains;

(m) acknowledge that overdependencies on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and green transition also render the EU vulnerable; therefore, strengthen economic security-related actions in the area of green transition; in the light of the fact that China's export of clean/green technologies is largely driven by industrial policy objectives and sustained by excessive state subsidies and export-oriented overcapacity, address the issue of unfair competition for European green-technology industries;

(n) recognise the immense socio-economic challenges currently confronting China, many of which stem from its own policy choices and structural imbalances; underline that the EU cannot accept distortions to global markets or threats to its strategic interests that undermine fair competition and economic sovereignty; reiterate that while prioritising negotiated solutions and open channels of communication, the EU reserves the right to pursue unilateral measures under its economic security strategy wherever engagement with Chinese authorities proves ineffective or insufficient; highlight that any resolution of China's overcapacity must be achieved without imposing disproportionate costs on EU taxpayers or industries;

(o) knowing that in times of significant economic pressure and increasing geostrategic transactionalism, the economic costs of coercion and economic retaliation should be avoided, find ways to counter the adverse effects of international tensions in the understanding that EU solidarity is essential to withstand international pressure; with that in mind, strengthen EU mechanisms to monitor and quickly target China's economic coercion against Member States, ensuring that no single EU Member State faces economic coercion alone; note that, following China's economic coercion against Lithuania, bilateral relations, including diplomatic and economic relations, have not yet normalised;

(p) proactively and jointly address the implications of technological and economic competition with China, especially the asymmetry in market access and the lack of legal certainty for European companies in China; stress the need for reciprocity and a level playing field in all trade and investment relations with China; insist that Beijing remove barriers and unfair practices that violate World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; support proportionate EU actions to defend its interests if China fails to provide reciprocal market openness;

(q) underscore the geopolitical ramifications of the US-China trade conflict and its potential spillover effects on the EU economy; actively shape the EU's Indo-Pacific and Asian partnerships by coordinating with like-minded actors, and seek closer alignment with them on trade, technology standards and supply chain resilience to work around China's monopoly in critical areas; seize the opportunity for the EU to present itself as a reliable and desirable partner in the Indo-Pacific and emphasise that increased cooperation with like-minded partners is essential in the light of the instrumentalisation by China of rare earth minerals and the need

for the EU to diversify its suppliers of critical raw materials to ensure resilient supply chains; in this regard, welcome the signing between the EU and Australia of the Strategic Partnership on sustainable critical and strategic minerals; stress the need for the EU to invest in the R&D and innovation ecosystem to avoid technological dependency;

(r) recognise the strategic importance of enhancing EU-India relations to counterbalance China's regional ambitions; consider India a key partner and ask India to take up its responsibility, also towards Russia, in consolidating the global security architecture rooted in the full respect of international norms and principles;

(s) further highlight the positive effect and strategic importance of deepening ties between the EU and Taiwan, which is a valuable partner in trade and technology; in this regard, coordinate with the EU's global partners;

(t) appoint an EU Special Envoy for the Korean Peninsula to closely monitor the situation and to coordinate the necessary measures with the international community, including engaging with China to confirm its opposition to the North Korean nuclear programme and use its influence to stop it;

(u) strengthen EU engagement in the Western Balkans to counter growing Chinese economic influence, particularly through the infrastructure investments and preferential loans China has provided that have created dependencies in some of these countries;

(v) recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic and the High North for European and transatlantic security; ensure that EU policy on China must reflect the strategic vulnerabilities in this region, and include robust monitoring of Chinese scientific, economic and infrastructural activities in the Arctic, especially their dual-use nature and their interaction with Russian military presence in the region;

(w) further develop the Global Gateway in order to offer a model of trusted connectivity that is based on equality, sustainability and transparency, providing a credible alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative fully based on sustainable development, while fully respecting international and EU norms and standards, including the Paris Agreement, the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework, and International Labour Organization (ILO) core conventions;

(x) recognise that the EU has to be more efficient in its Global Gateway projects and that this is possible without compromising EU norms and standards regarding transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and economic viability; insist that Global Gateway projects should support fair, mutually beneficial, climate-resilient and transparent development partnerships with countries that align themselves with the EU rather than with China or other authoritarian powers; recognise that Africa is a priority partner for the Global Gateway in this effort and enhance the EU's overall engagement with the continent, while also acknowledging Latin America as a priority partner;

(y) counter China's expanding political and economic footprint by offering a better alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative through the Global Gateway and

similar EU initiatives to increase the EU's presence and engagement with partners in the Global South, particularly African and Latin American countries; strengthen efforts to counter anti-EU narratives in these countries; engage with China to reduce and alleviate the debt burden on developing countries, also by transforming its loans into grants; call attention to China's growing economic, political and security influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, large-scale infrastructure and port investments, military engagement and technological cooperation with authoritarian regimes such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela; warn that these activities strengthen China's global strategic reach and increase economic dependencies;

(z) reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under the Global Gateway to prevent EU-funded infrastructure projects from creating or deepening strategic dependencies on China; stresses the need for transparent procurement, risk mitigation and consistent application of EU standards;

(aa) strengthen due-diligence and anti-corruption screening in all EU external funding and investment instruments involving China; ensure that no entity involved in systemic corruption can participate in EU-financed projects; introduce anti-corruption standards and stricter transparency requirements for supply chains, ownership structures and subcontracting, and establish mechanisms for continuous monitoring of corruption risks in projects involving Chinese partners;

(ab) recognising that China's military-civil fusion strategy is a state-driven effort to integrate civilian and military sectors in order to enhance Chinese government control and the People's Liberation Army's capabilities by acquiring advanced global technologies, express concern about Chinese private companies aligning with state interests, thus advancing China's geopolitical influence; highlighting that the military-civil fusion seeks global technological, economic and military dominance, urges the Commission and the Member States to reduce EU dependency on Chinese-controlled resources and infrastructure that pose security, intelligence and economic risks to Europe's autonomy and strategic resilience; condemns China's revised National Defence Mobilisation Law, which came into effect on 1 October 2026 and brings all Chinese technology, data and software under direct authority of China's military leadership in the event of mobilisation; highlights the urgent need to de-risk critical ICT supply chains;

(ac) confirm that the EU's One China policy is the guiding framework for the EU's foreign policy decisions as regards Taiwan and that the EU has never endorsed the One China Principle and opposes any provocation or unilateral attempt to violate the status quo by force or coercion, or against the will of the Taiwanese people; work with Member States and other democratic partners in the region on closer security coordination, including a continuous naval presence and joint exercises, to reinforce stability in the region; fulfil the pledge made by the Commission before Parliament to work towards deterring China from provoking or escalating tensions with Taiwan; make clear that the EU will continue to develop its relations with the island in a number of areas, while adhering to the EU's long-standing One China policy and encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement across the Taiwan Strait; in this context, call on the United Nations to reject Chinese demands and grant Taiwanese passport holders – including tourists, journalists, NGO workers and political activists – access to tours and events in the

United Nations;

(ad) reject China’s attempts to coerce international organisations, third countries and other actors into restricting Taiwan’s international participation and contacts, as recently demonstrated by the pressure exerted by Beijing over the participation of Taiwan’s Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim in the Ventotene European Conference for Freedom and Democracy organised by the European Parliament;

(ae) actively engage in diplomatic efforts to push back against China’s escalation in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Sea; reaffirm unwavering support for freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific, in line with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); strengthen maritime security cooperation with India and other Indo-Pacific partners in response to China's expanding naval presence in the region and systematic attempts to severely undermine freedom of navigation; intensify dialogue with China with a view to strengthening the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and increasing transparency on the scope and activities of its fleet;

(af) put forward concrete contingency measures, including scenario planning, designed to deter Beijing's disruptive unilateral actions in the region; keep defending the principle of the prohibition of the use of force codified in the UN Charter which applies regardless of sovereignty disputes; oppose the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by China to support its claims over Taiwan’s territory and sovereignty;

(ag) highlight the importance of deepening economic and technological cooperation with Taiwan in fields such as semiconductors and cybersecurity, as a way to strengthen Europe’s resilience and safeguard critical supply chains; launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding on critical supply chains, with Taiwan; stress the potential for cooperation on policy regarding FDI screening and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

(ah) bolster EU preparedness and democratic resilience to counter the growing risks from Chinese proliferated technologies and hybrid threats, including in areas such as data storage, connected vehicles and electricity grids, and from foreign information manipulation and political interference, and espionage, particularly when they occur on China-linked social media platforms, such as TikTok, Wechat and Xiaohongshu, and other platforms, such as Chinese online shops that gather personal data;

(ai) underline that Chinese influence operations are documented in EEAS Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threat reports and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) assessments, and aim to influence European public debate, exfiltrate sensitive data, spread conspiracy theories and undermine democratic processes; in addition, they pose risks to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression;

(aj) acknowledging that these influence activities use opaque algorithms, demand transparency on algorithms, data flows to China, and potential influence by

Chinese state organs; in parallel, adopt an integrated response encompassing cyber, political, informational and technological dimensions and all necessary measures to prevent illegal digital activities, counter Chinese disinformation campaigns and other types of hybrid operations;

(ak) strengthen EU cybersecurity frameworks, being mindful of the growing use of generative artificial intelligence for the automated dissemination of disinformation and for the influencing of democratic processes, and of the risks in the area of the Internet of Things (IoT); fortify, moreover, server defences against cyberattacks and apply the Digital Services Act[10], the Data Act[11] and other EU digital legislation to mitigate systemic risks posed by platforms linked to Chinese state influence;

(al) urge Member States to rigorously implement the EU's FDI Screening Regulation to shield critical assets, such as ports, energy grids and telecommunications, including 5G networks, from strategic threats;

(am) strongly intensify the structured exchange between the EU, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the area of disinformation, early warning and information exchange, and strengthen coordination with these like-minded partners to reinforce societal and institutional resilience against hybrid threats;

(an) engage with China to reinforce and make more effective the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in order to keep the pressure firmly on China with regard to the defence of human rights and to not ignore human rights in EU-China relations;

(ao) condemn China's systemic repression of ethnic and religious minorities, including through forced labour and mass surveillance, at every political meeting with Chinese counterparts; express deep concern over the adoption of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress and its potential to further institutionalise assimilationist policies and undermine the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of ethnic minorities; in particular, express deep concern regarding China's systemic repression and forced assimilation policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, including attempts at forced Sinicisation and destruction of cultural heritage, such as interference in the processes for monitoring the election of Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, and demand the immediate abolition of the state-run residential boarding school system for Tibetan children; further strengthen EU pressure regarding China's ongoing atrocities against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, emphasising that mass arbitrary detention, forced labour, and severe violations of freedom of religion continue despite the nominal closure of the internment camps; insist that the EU integrate the widespread and systematic repression of Uyghurs as a priority issue across all dimensions of EU-China relations; condemn China's

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10 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).

11 Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Data Act) (OJ L, 2023/2854, 22.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj).

continued denial of freedom of religion or belief, including the systematic persecution of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and others outside state-controlled religious organisations, through harassment, detention, demolition of sacred symbols and places of worship and other repressive measures;

(ap) recall that the flash floods that struck the Nepal-Tibet border on 26 August 2026 caused mass casualties and destruction on both sides of the border; express regret that Chinese state media have reported casualty and missing-person figures for the Tibetan side that are markedly lower than those cited by international human rights organisations; deplore the fact that eyewitness footage and survivor accounts from Tibet have been removed from Chinese social media platforms, foreign journalists have been permitted only government-supervised access, and China's Ministry of Public Security has confirmed that individuals were penalised for sharing information about the disaster; stress that this pattern of information control obstructs accountability to the disaster's victims and their families; call on the Chinese authorities to grant immediate, unimpeded access to independent observers, journalists and humanitarian organisations to the Tibetan areas affected by the August 2026 Nepal-Tibet border floods, and to publish full and verifiable casualty data; call for accountability to the victims and their families;

(aq) engage with and urge China to respect and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ratify all fundamental ILO conventions; guarantee actively that due diligence is ensured along global supply chains and that EU business operating with China as well as Chinese business operating with the EU respect the relevant ILO conventions on forced labour and workers' rights; strengthen and fully enforce import-ban instruments, including vigorous implementation of the Forced Labour Regulation[12] and customs-led controls, and swiftly implement an import ban on all goods made with state-imposed forced labour;

(ar) ask for the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama and demand the unconditional release of political prisoners, including the 2019 Sakharov laureate Ilham Tohti, EU-citizen Gui Minhai, Gulshan Abbas, Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan, Xu Zhiyong, Huang Xueqin and Zhang Zhan, and ethnic Mongol activist Hada, detained Uyghur scholars and cultural figures, including the unlawfully imprisoned brothers of EU citizen Dolkun Isa, Professor Yalkun Isa and Hushtar Isa and others; call for the termination of the practice of residential surveillance at a designated location, call for freedom of movement for 2008 Sakharov laureate Hu Jia and ask news on his current status; insist that China frees the laureate of the 2023 Franco-German Prize for Human Rights and the Rule of Law Chow Hang-tung as well as Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, Leung Kwok hung, Owen Chow and individuals of Hong Kong 47 group who remain imprisoned under the national security law; condemn the prosecution of former pro-democracy lawmaker Au Kam San under Macao's national security law and call for his immediate and unconditional release; condemn the use of the death penalty in China, and recall that the total estimated number of executions in China

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12 Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L, 2024/3015, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj).

exceeds all other countries that apply capital punishment; support independent Chinese, Hong Kong, and diasporic civil-society actors, environmental defenders, and labour rights advocates and human rights defenders; call for an EU-China Civil-Society Dialogue Facility that protects participants from retaliation and strengthens academic freedom and cross-border cooperation grounded in universal human rights;

(as) firmly call on the Chinese authorities to repeal Article 63 of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which purports to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals residing in third countries and constitutes a direct violation of international law and the sovereign jurisdiction of the EU Member States; develop an EU-wide framework for identifying and countering transnational repression on European soil;

(at) reiterate that human rights are universal, indivisible and inalienable, and cannot be characterised as internal affairs; call on China to ratify the ICCPR without further delay and to comply fully with its provisions in the meantime, including in Hong Kong where the covenant is legally binding pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and takes precedence over national security legislation; suspend all extradition arrangements to Hong Kong pending the full restoration of judicial independence and freedom of expression guarantees; agree, with China, on a concrete and time-bound roadmap for tangible and verifiable progress in the EU–China Human Rights Dialogue, moving beyond procedural exchanges to substantive outcomes;

(au) strongly condemn China's forced return of North Korean refugees – in particular women – in violation of the principle of non-refoulement and international refugee law, and which places their lives in grave and imminent danger; call on China to uphold its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and to allow the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees access to North Korean nationals on its territory;

(av) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression, including through digital means, and call on China to close down all so-called Chinese overseas police service stations in the EU;

(aw) express the EU's strong disapproval of China's transnational repression activities as well as the cross-border application of Chinese law, such as the launching of an investigation of Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen Pao-Yang under a 2024 judiciary guideline accusing him of launching a 'pro-Taiwanese independence separatist organisation'; call on China to stop returning refugees to North Korea and to instead ensure their protection in line with international refugee law;

(ax) preserve and honour the memory of the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre and actively counter the Chinese authorities' attempts to erase this crime from public memory; task the EU Delegation in Beijing with commemorating the victims every year on 4 June, including by lowering the EU flag to half mast, displaying candles in the windows of the EU Delegation or undertaking other appropriate symbolic acts of remembrance; initiate and support activities aimed at preserving the historical record of the massacre and ensuring that its memory is passed on to future generations; recognise the Tiananmen Square massacre as a

defining moment in China’s modern history and as a stark warning of the totalitarian direction subsequently pursued by the Chinese Communist Party;

(ay) strongly condemn all forms of gender-based violence, including the trafficking of women and girls; demand immediate, unhindered access for independent UN and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights mechanisms to China;

(az) support and reinforce the role of the International Criminal Court in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes against humanity and explore the use of international accountability mechanisms;

(ba) identify and close down any avenues that currently facilitate transnational repression by China in the EU, including through digital means, and, in particular, those targeting diaspora communities through so-called Chinese overseas police service stations, in cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners; address China’s practice of arbitrary exit bans against European citizens in China;

(bb) recognise that Europe’s security and prosperity cannot be guaranteed by replacing one dependency with another and should instead be fostered by strengthening itself from within, in line with the Letta and Draghi reports, by eliminating internal market barriers, building genuine open strategic autonomy and completing the European defence union, implementing institutional reform through an ‘urgency convention’ , while diversifying the EU's economic and trade relations; draw up and present a robust and effective EU economic security strategy that clearly maps Europe’s vulnerabilities and identifies areas where the EU holds real leverage;

(bc) remain mindful of the importance of keeping democracies united in response to attempts to divide them and of the strategic interests of China and Russia; work collaboratively mainly with the United States and other like-minded countries to formulate strategies concerning China's increasingly assertive stance on the global stage; strengthen the European pillar of defence within the transatlantic alliance while consolidating the transatlantic bond and reinforcing NATO;

(bd) note that European resilience must be rooted in democratic values, strong social cohesion and sustainable industrial leadership; reinforce the EU’s civilian crisis-management, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding capacities;

(be) express deep concern over the massive expansion of China's nuclear arsenal; work diplomatically to prevent a new nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear escalation; exert influence on China to participate in future arms control and disarmament processes and use diplomatic means to ensure that China uses its leverage on Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime;

(bf) increase public diplomacy efforts in China to provide authentic information about the EU’s policies and actions, and work to strengthen knowledge of China in all EU institutions; emphasise, while exchanges between European and Chinese universities are in place, the importance of clear guidance for engagement between EU universities and Chinese entities; strengthen the coordination and

coherence of policies across EU Member States and institutions in order to develop a common and coherent strategy towards China; ensure that such a strategy includes enhanced coordination among Member States on their main political leaders' visits to China and the main messages addressed to the Chinese leadership so as to avoid political fragmentation; adopt a unitary and coordinated strategy to diplomatically engage with China, firmly protect the EU geopolitical and economic interests, improve bilateral relations and pursue mutually beneficial cooperation; encourage fair and responsible people-to-people exchanges;

2. Welcomes the decision by China in April 2025 to unilaterally lift restrictions against certain current and former Members of the European Parliament, as well as the Subcommittee on Human Rights; notes with concern that over 100 European citizens, including, Samuel Cogolati, Dovilė Šakalienė, Adrian Zenz and Björn Jerdén, the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union, the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Germany and the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in Denmark are still under sanctions imposed by China;

3. Calls on the Chinese authorities to lift all sanctions imposed on European current and former national parliamentarians, institutions and entities, as well as their current and former staff, which were adopted in March 2021 in response to the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and democratic functions;

4. Emphasises that the EU must treat Chinese sanctions against European researchers, national parliamentarians and security experts as a hostile political act; condemns any attempt at curtailing academic freedom and hindering the work of researchers and scientists;

5. Urges EU Member States and institutions to avoid political fragmentation and to adopt a unitary and coordinated strategy to diplomatically and firmly engage with China, protect the EU’s geopolitical and economic interests, promote human rights, and pursue mutually beneficial cooperation; welcomes the resumption of interparliamentary dialogue with the Chinese National People’s Congress; calls for full transparency and reciprocity in all parliamentary exchanges, including safeguards for Members expressing their legitimate views;

6. Calls for a strengthening of the role of Parliament as a strategic actor in shaping the EU’s policy towards China and for its own cybersecurity infrastructure and digital resilience to be reinforced in order to protect its internal networks, sensitive data and parliamentary processes from cyber threats, espionage and foreign information manipulation, as outlined in this recommendation;

7. Calls on the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council to dedicate increased attention to China as a strategic global actor, to adopt more regular conclusions on EU-China relations, and to provide clear guidance on priorities and coordinated actions;

8. Requests that this recommendation be translated into Mandarin Chinese;

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9. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission

and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the Government of the People's Republic of China.