O. whereas, in particular, China has dramatically expanded its industrial capacity in strategic green and transport sectors, becoming the world’s leading producer of solar panels, a dominant global actor in wind turbine manufacturing, and a major exporter of high-speed rail technology; whereas overdependence on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and the green transition renders the EU and its partner countries vulnerable; P. whereas the EU needs to diversify its supply chains, boost domestic processing capacity and significantly increase its recycling and reuse of critical raw materials; whereas Chinese critical raw materials account for 98 % of all rare earth elements imported by the EU; whereas China holds a virtual monopoly on the production of rare earths, accounting for approximately 60 % of global extraction and 90 % of refining, and on the production of permanent magnets, accounting for 94 % of global capacity, and benefits from a fully vertically integrated supply chain in these sectors; whereas restrictive measures such as export controls on critical raw materials are a direct threat to the European economy, especially the automotive, machinery and defence sectors; whereas China has the largest industrial fishing fleet in the world and, out of the 152 countries examined in 2023 by the IUU Fishing Risk Index, China was the lowestoverall-scoring coastal state for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices; Q. whereas the EU should pursue an autonomous, interest-based approach that safeguards European economic security and strategic sovereignty; whereas the EU has a considerable trade toolbox it could proactively and assertively use to address the unbalanced EU-China trade relationship; whereas the EU should also work more closely with like-minded partners, such as Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and the United States; R. whereas China’s assertive geopolitical, technological, and economic policies, including its Belt and Road Initiative, can sometimes run counter to the rules-based international order and international governance models, as well as the EU’s core values, global partnerships and geopolitical interests; S. whereas the EU is the world’s largest aid donor and China the world’s largest international development lender; whereas China’s overseas lending has funded major infrastructure projects in developing countries without, however, reducing their debt burdens, and in some cases even aggravating them; T. whereas, in particular, through a combination of state-directed investment, strategic infrastructure acquisition, technology transfer, influence operations and long-term debt exposure, China seeks to expand its footprint within the EU and the EU’s neighbourhood and exploit governance vulnerabilities, economic pressures and institutional weaknesses; whereas this affects transparency, democratic standards and the EU’s capacity to promote stability, convergence and rule-of-law reforms in its neighbourhood; U. whereas, specifically, China views the Western Balkans as a strategic area for its Belt and Road Initiative, investing in their extractive and raw materials sectors; whereas China’s investments in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus establish a physical continuum between Asia and Europe, and present both risks and opportunities for the EU’s engagement with regional partners;