between the EU and China and offers an opportunity to assess where the EU’s China policy has succeeded and where it has failed and to update the EU’s strategic approach; whereas the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 19859 remains the main legal framework for their economic and trade relations; whereas the latest EU-China Summit was held in Beijing on 24 July 2025; D. whereas dialogue and diplomatic engagement remain essential tools for managing EUChina relations despite significant divergences; whereas high-level political dialogue, including the EU-China summit held in Beijing in July 2025, should be maintained to address shared global challenges; whereas such critical engagement must not compromise EU positions on fundamental values and principles, including respect for international law, human rights, and China’s full compliance with the rules and principles of the multilateral system and international organisations; E. whereas relations between the European Parliament and National People’s Congress were interrupted from 2019 to 2025 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s sanctions against the European Parliament and other EU citizens and entities; whereas in 2025 China lifted sanctions against the European Parliament and the European Parliament decided to resume its relations with China; F. whereas the People's Republic of China’s domestic and international policy has reduced space for partnership and increased competition with the EU and other democracies; whereas China is, of its own accord, clearly shifting EU-China relations towards systemic rivalry; whereas, cooperating where possible, competing fairly and confronting where required is essential to protect EU interests; whereas it is becoming essential for the EU to build leverage while engaging with China; G. whereas the EU expects China to prove its interest in improving EU-China relations, including a fair trade approach, as well as in preventing decoupling and bloc-based confrontation; whereas the EU’s objective should be to strengthen its strategic autonomy, underpinned neither by dependence nor by confrontation, but by principled engagement from a position of strength, protecting European values, interests, security and prosperity while preserving channels of dialogue and cooperation; whereas engagement does not imply endorsement, convergence, lowering of standards or leniency toward violations of human rights; whereas cooperation should be reversible and combine deeper partnership with greater alignment on rules; H. whereas cooperation with China is necessary to address global challenges, such as climate change, peace and sustainable development; whereas it therefore requires the EU to pursue a principled, coherent, and human rights-centred China policy grounded in international law, democratic resilience and economic de-risking; whereas such a policy should not compromise the EU’s own positions on fundamental values and principles; I. whereas China is a decisive enabler of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, serving as the largest provider of dual-use goods and helping it circumvent sanctions; whereas without China’s and other countries' support, Russia would not be able to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine to the same 9 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China (OJ L 250, 19.9.1985, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1985/2616/oj).