circumvention of international sanctions; (g) act immediately with partners and allies to extend targeted restrictive measures and the listing of entities and supply-chain nodes that materially assist Russia, complemented by enforcement measures against shadow shipping and re-export schemes; in parallel, adopt binding risk-based measures to prevent sensitive technology transfers to China, including safeguards in research cooperation mechanisms to prevent use for military and surveillance purposes, or human rights violations, as well as to avoid technology transfer to countries sanctioned by the EU such as Russia, Iran or North Korea; (h) urgently take action in order to address the weaponisation of critical dependencies by China and rigorously pursue the strategy of economic de-risking and economic rebalancing in EU-China relations; acknowledge that de-risking should focus on specific strategic sectors such as critical raw materials, critical medicines, industrial magnets and , biotechnology, quantum computing, battery and battery components, electric vehicles, ICT and semiconductors; establish robust mechanisms to safeguard critical technologies, infrastructure and supply chains, promoting European strategic autonomy while maintaining pragmatic engagement with China that facilitates non-confrontational coexistence, protects European values and interests, and supports and complements a coherent and assertive China policy; investigate Chinese coercive behaviour in the area of rare earths and consider the use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument; (i) ensure that the EU’s de-risking strategy is accompanied by climate, energy and industrial policies that avoid increasing dependencies on Chinese components and technologies as well as targeted investment in European industrial capacity and innovation, particularly in critical technologies and advanced materials, to reduce external dependencies, move production to the EU and foster competitiveness within the single market; in particular, de-risking must prioritise strategic autonomy, sustainability, and circular-economy solutions that fully comply with human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental standards; (j) recognise that the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) market poses a big threat to the EU EV market due to the fact that China exports its manufacturing surplus, thus making the EU EV market less competitive and specifically harming countries whose GDP relies heavily on the automotive sector; recognise that Chinese EVs and the technology they use pose a security threat, and that the EU should adopt effective legislation to prevent such technologies being used to collect sensitive data from EVs; (k) ensure the strict application of customs duties on small non-European parcels valued at EUR 150 or less, in force since the 1 July 2026, and of the EU-wide handling fee on small parcels applicable from 1 November 2026; check the effectiveness of existing measures in curbing the harmful effects of practices such as ‘ultra-fast fashion’; stand ready, where necessary, to urge Member State authorities to adopt any further action required to intensify and tighten controls on non-compliant, dangerous or unsafe goods often sold through Chinese online platforms (such as Temu, Shein or AliExpress); (l) take action to prevent further security risks arising from Chinese foreign