extent or with the same force; whereas China’s diplomatic, economic, and material support to Russia’s war of aggression, including the supply of dual use items used in military supply chains, violates the UN Charter and China's own narrative of neutrality, including China’s own Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; whereas China is directly involved in developing ammunition production capabilities in Belarus, including through the provision of key production equipment and production lines, further strengthening the military-industrial capacity available to support Russia’s war effort; whereas the People’s Republic of China continues to deepen its military cooperation with Russia and Belarus, including through joint military exercises, conducted even in the immediate vicinity of the EU, despite both countries engaging in hostile activities against Member States and posing a direct threat to European security; J. whereas China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and therefore holds responsibilities to uphold a multilateral rules-based international order, and an effective global and digital governance, based on the respect of the UN Charter and international law; whereas China’s position vis-a-vis Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine will be a determining factor for EU-China relations going forward; K. whereas China agreed to a ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia on 4 February 2022, and whereas cooperation between the two countries has strengthened in recent years; whereas Chinese and Russian media are disseminating unacceptable narratives about Ukraine; whereas China is cooperating with Russia in areas such as defence, space and trade, as well as in dual-use technologies and in building synergies in the Arctic; whereas China’s President Xi Jinping declined to visit Brussels and instead travelled to Moscow, prioritising China’s relationship with Russia; L. whereas the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only state that has directly deployed troops in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas serious concerns persist regarding potential transfers of nuclear or ballistic missile–related technologies to the DPRK in exchange for arms and military personnel supplied to Russia; whereas, since 2024, Chinese authorities have reportedly forcibly repatriated at least 406 refugees to the DPRK, thus contributing to the serious human rights violations committed under the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Un; M. whereas the EU’s trade deficit with China stood at EUR 305,8 billion in 2024; whereas the growing asymmetry in EU-China relations in key sectors, including access to markets, technological capabilities, industrial policy and critical raw materials, poses challenges and creates dependencies for the EU, while providing opportunities for Chinese coercion; N. whereas Chinese industrial policies create massive overcapacities, thereby applying pressure on the European economy and increasingly threatening to hollow out the EU’s industrial core, which may amount to an existential threat to the EU; whereas China is distorting global markets through state subsidies, price dumping and the politicisation of trade; whereas China is blocking European market access and denies legal certainty to European businesses; whereas these hostile and unfair practices are tilting the balance of risks and opportunities in the EU-China economic and trade relationship towards China; whereas China seeks to increase dependencies in EU-China relations; whereas this practice has turned China from a potential partner into a trade and economic competitor;