investment by strengthening foreign direct investment (FDI) screening in Member States, particularly in strategic sectors such as media services, critical raw materials, critical infrastructure and technologies; urgently address the monopolistic positions of China in critical and essential chokepoints by prioritising the strengthening of alternative resilient supply chains; (m) acknowledge that overdependencies on Chinese technologies and resources in the area of climate change prevention and green transition also render the EU vulnerable; therefore, strengthen economic security-related actions in the area of green transition; in the light of the fact that China’s export of clean/green technologies is largely driven by industrial policy objectives and sustained by excessive state subsidies and export-oriented overcapacity, address the issue of unfair competition for European green-technology industries; (n) recognise the immense socio-economic challenges currently confronting China, many of which stem from its own policy choices and structural imbalances; underline that the EU cannot accept distortions to global markets or threats to its strategic interests that undermine fair competition and economic sovereignty; reiterate that while prioritising negotiated solutions and open channels of communication, the EU reserves the right to pursue unilateral measures under its economic security strategy wherever engagement with Chinese authorities proves ineffective or insufficient; highlight that any resolution of China's overcapacity must be achieved without imposing disproportionate costs on EU taxpayers or industries; (o) knowing that in times of significant economic pressure and increasing geostrategic transactionalism, the economic costs of coercion and economic retaliation should be avoided, find ways to counter the adverse effects of international tensions in the understanding that EU solidarity is essential to withstand international pressure; with that in mind, strengthen EU mechanisms to monitor and quickly target China’s economic coercion against Member States, ensuring that no single EU Member State faces economic coercion alone; note that, following China’s economic coercion against Lithuania, bilateral relations, including diplomatic and economic relations, have not yet normalised; (p) proactively and jointly address the implications of technological and economic competition with China, especially the asymmetry in market access and the lack of legal certainty for European companies in China; stress the need for reciprocity and a level playing field in all trade and investment relations with China; insist that Beijing remove barriers and unfair practices that violate World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; support proportionate EU actions to defend its interests if China fails to provide reciprocal market openness; (q) underscore the geopolitical ramifications of the US-China trade conflict and its potential spillover effects on the EU economy; actively shape the EU’s IndoPacific and Asian partnerships by coordinating with like-minded actors, and seek closer alignment with them on trade, technology standards and supply chain resilience to work around China's monopoly in critical areas; seize the opportunity for the EU to present itself as a reliable and desirable partner in the Indo-Pacific and emphasise that increased cooperation with like-minded partners is essential in the light of the instrumentalisation by China of rare earth minerals and the need