– having regard to the report of its Committee on Foreign Affairs on the security and defence implications of Chinese influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union, – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 June 2016 entitled ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’ (JOIN(2016)0030), – having regard to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the resolution of 23 February 2023 entitled ‘Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’ and the resolution of 1 March 2022 on the aggression against Ukraine, – having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure1 , – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2023)0160), – having regard to the EU toolbox for 5G security of 29 January 2020, – having regard to the proposal for a regulation of 14 September 2022 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453), – having regard to the proposal for a directive of 23 February 2022 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2022)0071), – having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0375/2023), A. whereas the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is simultaneously a partner and also increasingly a competitor and systemic rival to the EU; whereas China is, of its own accord, clearly shifting the core of our relations towards systemic rivalry; whereas this competition and rivalry is not sought by the EU; whereas the EU’s policy has been, and should continue to be, guided by the principle of cooperating where possible, competing when needed and confronting where necessary; whereas China is rapidly becoming the dominant regional and global power; whereas this has fundamental implications for the EU’s role in the global economy and the EU’s security; whereas a common EU policy towards China will determine the EU’s future in global affairs; B. whereas the Chinese Government is strengthening its role and influence in international institutions and has both the intention and, at the same time the economic, technological and military means to reshape the international rules-based order; whereas, as a permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, China must assume its 1 OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1.