(al) address China’s increased presence in the Arctic and its policy and goals in the region, including its ambitions to launch a Polar Silk Road, to expand its energy supply and to access Arctic resources; examine the impact thereof on security, regional governance and the environment; (am) strengthen the work of the EEAS Strategic Communication division on tackling foreign information manipulation and interference by state actors such as China; point out that these efforts must be allocated sufficient resources, given the scale of the problem and its detrimental effects on the EU and its Member States’ political systems; work with the Commission to encourage and coordinate actions aimed at countering China’s foreign financing of our democratic processes and China’s malign influence, including the strategy of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians; strengthen expertise and language capacity with regard to China in the EEAS, in Member States and in the EU institutions in general to make use of open-source intelligence; (an) fully leverage the Global Gateway strategy as a tool to intensify the EU’s engagement in global development efforts and business relations with partners from developing countries to provide an alternative to Chinese-driven foreign investment strategies; intensify cooperation with international financial institutions and the private sector to mobilise the necessary funding; (ao) strengthen cooperation between national intelligence agencies in identifying and addressing Chinese espionage and other subversive activities seeking to influence or undermine our democracies, and fully implement all EU guidelines and measures to mitigate security risks across Europe’s connectivity infrastructure; (ap) increase cooperation with like-minded partners on international standard setting in the relevant international bodies to ensure Europe’s economic competitiveness and to prevent one-sided Chinese dominance; (aq) fully implement the EU’s ‘5G security toolbox’ guidelines to mitigate security risks in networks, and propose additional security standards for Chinese suppliers of 5G; welcomes the decision of the EU institutions and institutions in several EU Member States to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices, as well as personal devices enrolled in the institutions’ mobile device services; 2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and, for information, to the Government of the People’s Republic of China.