European market for Chinese goods and services and to technology and know-how in order to support plans such as ‘Made in China 2025’, and to strengthen its political and diplomatic influence in Europe; stresses that these ambitions have intensified in particular in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, shaping new dynamics in EU-China relations; 7. Calls on those Member States participating in the 16+1 format to ensure that their participation in this format enables the EU to have one voice in its relationship with China; calls on those Member States to carry out sound analysis and scrutiny of suggested infrastructure projects involving all the stakeholders and to ensure no compromising of national and European interests for short-term financial support and long- term commitments to Chinese involvement in strategic infrastructure projects and potentially greater political influence, which would undermine the EU’s common positions on China; is aware of China's increasing influence on the infrastructure and markets of the EU candidate countries; underlines the necessity of transparency of the format by inviting the EU institutions to its meetings and keeping them fully briefed on its activities in order to ensure that relevant aspects are coherent with EU policy and legislation and give all sides mutual benefits and opportunities; 8. Notes the Chinese interest in strategic infrastructure investments in Europe; concludes that the Chinese Government is using the BRI as a very effective narrative framework for elements of its foreign policy and that EU public diplomacy efforts need to be strengthened in the light of this development; supports the call on China to adhere to the principles of transparency in public procurement as well as environmental and social standards; calls on all EU Member States to support EU public diplomacy responses; suggests that data on all Chinese infrastructure investments in EU Member States and countries in process of EU accession negotiations be shared with the EU institutions and other Member States; recalls that such investments are part of an overall strategy to have Chinese state-controlled or state-funded companies take control of banking and the energy sector, as well as other supply chains; underlines six overarching challenges of the BRI: a multilateral approach to BRI governance; very little local labour employed, receiving country and third-country contractor involvement extremely limited (about 86 percent of BRI projects involve Chinese contractors), construction materials and equipment imported from China, lack of transparency on tenders, and the potential use of Chinese standards instead of international standards; insists that the BRI must include human rights safeguards, and believes that it is of the utmost importance to develop synergies and projects in full transparency and with the involvement of all the stakeholders and in line with EU legislation, while complementing EU policies and projects in order to deliver benefits for all countries along the planned routes; welcomes the setting-up of the EUChina Connectivity Platform, which promotes cooperation in transport infrastructure across the Eurasian continent; notes with satisfaction that several infrastructure projects have been identified, and underlines that projects should be implemented on the basis of key principles such as promotion of economically, socially and environmentally sustainable projects, geographic balance, and a level playing field among investors and project promoters, as well as transparency; 9. Takes positive note that the EU policy on China forms part of a rounded policy approach to the Asia-Pacific region, taking full advantage and account of the EU's close relations with partners such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand;