consultations must take place at EU level, for example through a joint Trade Policy Committee-Political and Security Committee meeting at Council level, before BRI-related events in order to ensure that Member States speak with one voice; stresses that the BRI must meet international standards; underlines that BRI projects must be closely monitored, including with regard to their negative political effects in the EU; (e) monitoring key infrastructure contracts in Member States and accession countries to ensure their conformity with EU legislation, as well as their alignment with the EU’s strategic interests, as defined by the EU-China strategy; protecting critical infrastructure from the influence of third countries, which could be detrimental to the EU and its Member States’ economic and security interests; 25. Underlines that the bilateral and uncoordinated engagement of some Member States with China, and the failure to inform the Commission when signing Memoranda of Understanding with third countries, is counterproductive and damaging to the EU’s global position and the advantage its Member States have in the negotiations when acting as a Union rather than independent state actors; asks Member States to refrain from signing any such memoranda without consulting the Council and the Commission; calls for the establishment of a coordination mechanism at EU level to deal with such issues; recalls Article 24 TEU, which notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’, and that they ‘shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’; 26. Stresses that the implementation of the EU-China strategy and national strategies and policies towards China should be regularly coordinated between the EU institutions, the Member States, the different Commission Directorates General and the European Parliament, in order to ensure a comprehensive and consistent policy that avoids compartmentalisation of separate policy areas; believes that policies should also be coordinated with regional and local actors that develop and maintain links with China; 27. Expresses concern about the increasing incidence of hybrid attacks, Chinese industrial espionage and cyber theft against European companies; stresses the importance of strengthening private and public cyber capabilities; calls for stronger cooperation and the establishment of a system aimed at ending malicious acts in cyber space on the part of China, including cyberattacks, forced technology transfers, cyber-espionage and cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; underscores the need to foster closer cooperation with NATO and G7 countries to fight hybrid threats, including cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns stemming from China, including by allowing Member States to impose collective countermeasures on a voluntary basis, even if the nature of the attacks is not serious enough to trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or Article 42(7) TEU; 28. Calls on the Commission to encourage and coordinate actions aimed at countering China’s foreign financing of our democratic processes, including the strategy of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians;