responsibilities and uphold a rules-based international order, multilateralism and global governance; C. whereas both the European Union and China have an interest in pursuing active and stable relations; whereas the EU wishes these relations to be built on the pillars of respect for international law and on the principle of balanced reciprocal engagement and shared global responsibilities; whereas engagement with China is important to address global challenges; D. whereas the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not share the same values as European democracies, has become increasingly authoritarian domestically and promotes governance models internationally that contradict the EU’s values; whereas the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law should remain at the centre of the relationship between the EU and China, in line with the EU’s commitment to upholding these fundamental principles in all areas of its external action; whereas freedom of religion and belief is continuing to deteriorate across mainland China, with the CCP requiring all religions to adhere to the party’s ideology, doctrine, and teachings; E. whereas China committed to the ‘one country, two systems’ principle by signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration pertaining to the governance of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau; whereas the PRC has dismantled democracy in Hong Kong and Macau, and has cracked down on political opposition and pro-democracy activists and their family members in Hong Kong, Macau and abroad; whereas since the PRC imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on 30 June 2020, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the judiciary’s independence in Hong Kong have deteriorated alarmingly; whereas the PRC has fully violated the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; F. whereas China is moving into a new era of security and control characterised by an increasingly assertive economic and foreign policy, employing grey-zone activities, including military exercises, economic coercion, cyber warfare and information manipulation and seeks to change the international rules-based order; G. whereas the EU can only credibly defend its interests and values against an increasingly assertive China if it acts with a single, united and determined approach and remains consistent with its message; whereas the activities of some Member States, which may run counter to the provisions of Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union, are of concern; H. whereas in order to defend its core values and be treated as an equal partner, Europe needs a new approach towards China based on European open strategic autonomy, reciprocity and cooperation with like-minded partners, backed up by the necessary legislative and non-legislative instruments to defend itself against coercion; I. whereas the EU must not accept critical political or military support by China for Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas China has still not recognised the Russian invasion into Ukraine as a full-scale war of aggression and plays a vital role in the circumvention and mitigation of EU sanctions imposed against Russia; whereas the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of